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AIRLINES JETTISON THEIR PENSION PLANS:




T HE DOWNTURN IN the airline industry has left many carri-
ers searching for ways to cut costs and regain their previous
competitive stature. Passengers have seen the elimination of
such creature comforts as pillows and free meals, and have been
asked to pay as much as five dollars for headphones to watch in-
flight television.' These measures, however, amount to only
small savings in the context of the airlines' mounting debt. Ac-
cordingly, airlines looking for ways to rid themselves of billions
of dollars in costs are now targeting their employees' pension
plans. 2 In a recent decision, a federal judge approved US Air-
ways' "request to terminate the pension plans for machinists and
flight attendants," as well as a large retiree plan.' The termina-
tion shifts responsibility for the plans to the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"), 4 the government agency that
insures failed or terminated pensions.' US Airways' analysts ex-
pect the plan terminations to save the company $1 billion over
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Mark Pilling, Pension Burden Stacks Up, FLIGHT INT'L, Jan. 1, 2005, at 16; Susan
Carey, Judge Gives US Air Room to Maneuver, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2005, at A3.
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five years.6 While the cost-savings that result from a plan termi-
nation are clear from the airlines' perspectives, the cost to the
American public is another matter. The PBGC, already laden
with a $23.3 billion deficit, is on the verge of a taxpayer-funded
bailout, 7 and each termination leaves airline employees with
smaller pensions than previously agreed upon.8 Section II of
this comment will give an overview of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") and the types of pension plans
that it covers. Section III of this comment will give an overview
of the PBGC, the types of, pension plan terminations, the
PBGC's role in those terminations, and look at the PBGC's cur-
rent economic situation and how the downturn in the airline
industry has exacerbated. that situation. Finally, in Section IV,
this comment will-suggest needed changes to ensure the PBGC's
solvency, as well as changes that willgrant employees more pro-
tection in the event of a plan termination.
II. THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT
ERISA was enacted in 1974 to protect "the assets of millions of
Americans so that funds placed in retirement plans during their
working lives will be there when they retire."9 The legislation
was born out of "congressional findings that employee-benefit
plans substantially affect interstate commerce, federal tax reve-
nues, and the national public interest, as well as the continued
well-being and security of millions of employees and their de-
pendents." 10 Congress also found that pension plan mainte-
nance standards were inadequate, plan funds often were
insufficient to pay the benefits due, and that plans were termi-
nating before sufficient funds had accumulated.1" As a result,
Congress enacted ERISA establish "standards of conduct, re-
sponsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
6 Id.
7 Michael Schroeder, Pension Agency Puts Pressure on Congress, WALL ST. J., Jan.
7, 2005, at A4.
8 Albert B. Crenshaw & Keith L. Alexander, Pilots'Deal With United Thrown Out;
Carrier Works on Pact with Mechanics Union, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2005, at El.
9 Frequently Asked Questions about Pensions Plans and ERISA, at http://www.dol.
gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-compliance-pension.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).




plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions,
and ready access to the Federal courts."'' 2
ERISA replaces inconsistent state regulations with a uniform
federal system. 3 The federal system protects employee pen-
sions in five key ways. The system: (1) "[r]equires plans to pro-
vide participants with information about the plan including
important information about plan features and funding;"' 4 (2)
"[s]ets minimum standards for participation, vesting, benefit ac-
crual and funding. [ERISA] defines how long a person may be
required to work before becoming eligible to participate in a
plan, to accumulate benefits, and to have a non-forfeitable right
to those benefits;"'" (3) "establishes detailed funding rules that
require plan sponsors to provide adequate funding for" pension
plans;' 6 (4) requires plan fiduciaries to be accountable to plan
participants; 7 (5) gives plan participants a cause of action
against the benefit plan fiduciaries in the event he or she
breaches a fiduciary duty;"8 and (6) "[g]uarantees payment of
certain benefits if a defined plan is terminated, through a feder-
ally chartered corporation, known as the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation."' 9
ERISA also seeks to encourage the development of private
pension plans and minimize the financial burden on employers
12 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000)).
13 Id. § 77.
14 Frequently Asked Questions about Pensions Plans and ERISA, supra note 9.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. "ERISA generally defines a fiduciary as anyone who exercises discretion-
ary authority or control over a plan's management or assets, including anyone
who provides investment advice to the plan. Fiduciaries who do not follow the
principles of conduct may be held responsible for restoring losses to the plan."
Id.
i8 Id. ERISA fiduciary violations include: (1) "failure ... to operate the plan
prudently and for the exclusive benefit of participants"; (2) "[t]he use of plan
assets to benefit certain related parties in interest to the plan, including the plan
administrator, the plan sponsor, and parties related to these individuals"; (3)
"[t] he failure to properly value plan assets at their current fair market value, or to
hold plan assets in trust"; (4) "[t]he failure to make benefit payments, either
pension or welfare, due under the terms of the plan"; (5) "[t]aking any adverse
action against an individual for exercising his or her rights under the plan (e.g.,
being fired, fined, or otherwise being discriminated against)"; (6) "[t]he failure
of employers to offer continuing group health care coverage for at least 18
months after leaving their employer"; ERISA Enforcement, at http://www.dol.gov/
ebsa/erisa-enforcement.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
19 Frequently Asked Questions about Pensions Plans and ERISA, supra note 9.
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to maintain the plan by setting standard benefit disbursement
and claims processing procedures.2 °
A. PENSION PLANS UNDER ERISA
ERISA defines a pension plan as a "plan, fund, or program...
established or maintained by an employer or an employee or-
ganization, or by both, 21 that provides employees with retire-
ment income2 2 or defers employee compensation for a period
beyond employment. 23 Under ERISA, the two most prominent
types of pension plans are defined benefit pension plans and
defined contribution pension plans.
1. Defined Benefit Pension Plans
A defined benefit pension plan consists of a pool of assets
gathered from all participating employees, or through employer
contributions, instead of accounts dedicated to each individual
employee. 24 The employer bears the risk of the investment de-
creasing in value and must cover any plan shortfalls that result
from poor investments of the plan assets. 2' The primary factor
distinguishing a defined benefit pension plan from a defined
contribution plan is that, in a defined benefit plan, the benefit
levels are specified in advance. 26 A benefit formula that takes
into account an employee's years of service and salary deter-
mines the benefit level.27
Defined benefit plans are particularly popular amongst un-
ions and are often included in collective bargaining agree-
ments. 28 "In the private sector approximately 70% of AFL-CIO
20 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 2 (2004).
21 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (A) (1996).
22 Id. § 1002(2) (A) (i).
23 Id. § 1002(2) (A) (ii).
24 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 15 (2004) (citing Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999)).
25 Id.
26 Id. (citing Parada v. Parada, 999 P.2d 184 (2000)).
27 Id.; see also David A. Duff, What Kind of Plan Does a Small Business or Profes-
sional Client Need?, SK012 ALI-ABA 1 (A.B.A. Continuing Legal Educ.),Jul. 12-16,
2004, at *9. An example of a defined benefit computation formula would be that
the employee is entitled to "an annual pension at age 65 equal to 2% of his
highest three years salary for each year worked." Robert Lowe, Karen Grotberg,
& Susan Curtis, Emplqyee Benefit Plans in Corporate Acquisitions, Dispositions and
Mergers, 625 PLI/TAx 271 (Practicing Law Institute: Tax Law and Planning
Course Handbook Series), Oct. 2004, at *283.
28 Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, Report
of the Working Group on Defined Benefit Plan Funding and Discount Rate Is-
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members are [defined benefit] plan participants. That com-
pares to approximately 1 in 7 of the non-union workers in the
private sector."2" The popularity of defined benefit pension
plans likely stems from the PBGC's benefit guarantees, which
ensure a certain level of employee benefits in the event that the
plan terminates:
Defined benefit plans, however, do have drawbacks. Defined
benefit plan participants suffer significant benefit losses when
they change jobs,"' and the worker may experience even greater
financial detriment if he or she leaves prior to benefit vesting.
32
As a result, an employee under a defined benefit plan has a
large financial incentive to stay with one employer until his ben-
efits have vested or he is ready for retirement:- "This is the so-
called 'golden handcuffs' phenomenon. '' 4 In today's turbulent
airline industry, where layoffs and employee movement have be-
come commonplace, defined benefit pension plans may not be
the best choice. Airlines should shift their focus toward the far
more portable defined contribution pension plan.
2. Defined Contribution Pension Plans
A defined contribution plan consists of individualized ac-
counts for each participating employee.35 The employee's bene-
fits are based on the amount of his contributions, the amount of
the employer's contributions, and any gains or losses that the
investment incurs.36 "Types of defined contribution plans in-
clude profit-sharing plans, money purchase pension plans, thrift
plans, 401 (k) plans, and employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs) .""
sues, at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC_ 110703_report.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2005).
29 Id.
30 See id.
31 Johnathan Barry Forman, Public Pensions: Choosing Between Defined Benefit and




35 60A ANI. JuR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 16 (2004).
31 Id. (citing 26 U.S.C.A. § 414(i)). A defined contribution pension account
may also gain funds through the forfeiture of other participants' accounts.
Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, What is "Individual Account Plan" or "Defined Contribu-
tion Plan" Under 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(34) Which Defines Such Terms for Purposes of
Labor Law Provisions of Employee Retirement Act of 1974, 51 A.L.R. FED. 552, § 1
(2004) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)).
37 Lowe, supra note 27, at *282.
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Beneficiaries of a defined contribution plan who change jobs
do not suffer financially as much as beneficiaries under a de-
fined benefit plan. 8 Rather, an employee who changes jobs
often can "roll over any defined contribution plan accruals and
accumulate a large account balance for retirement."3 9 Benefits
in a defined contribution plan vest sooner than those in a de-
fined benefit plan, and the assets in the account can easily be
valued.4" "[P] ortability is one of the most important advantages
of defined contribution plans. '41 "[T]he lack of job security in
today's workplace," especially in the airline industry, makes the
portability of retirement benefits very important.42
Both defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans
have advantages and disadvantages. The PBGC, however, only
guarantees certain benefit levels prescribed under a defined
benefit plan. Benefit levels under a defined contribution plan
fluctuate according to the strength of the economy and stock
market forces.
III. THE PBGC
Title IV of ERISA established the PBGC, in part, to "[p] rovide
uninterrupted payment of some amount of benefits to partici-
pants in the event of plan insolvency; [and] [d]evelop regula-
tions to help assure the security of pension benefits for workers,
retirees, and beneficiaries. ' 4 3
The PBGC does not guarantee all benefits, but only those that
ERISA defines as "nonforfeitable. '44 "The term 'nonforfeitable'
when used with respect to a pension benefit or right means a
claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of
an immediate or deferred benefit under a pension plan which
arises from the participant's service, which is unconditional, and
which is legally enforceable against the plan."45 In Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,46 the United States Su-





43 J. Michael Cook, Pension Accounting: An Executive Guide to the Fundamentals
and the Changing Landscape, 1449 PLI/CoRP 1095, (Practicing Law Institute: Cor-
porate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series), Oct. 2004, at *1122; 60A AM.
JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 585 (2004).
44 60A AM JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 610 (2004).
45 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) (2000).
46 446 U.S. 359 (1980).
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preme Court emphasized that "the principal subject of the defi-
nition of 'nonforfeitable' is the word 'claim'. . . since it is the
claim that must, as provided in the definition of 'nonforfeit-
able,' be 'unconditional' and 'legally enforceable against the
plan."' The Court went on to assert that a claim can be "valid
and legally enforceable," despite the fact that the claimant was
not able to collect it from the assets of the pension plan at the
time it became nonforfeitable.4 8 Further, while a beneficiary's
realization of his nonforfeitable pension benefits depends on
the adequacy of the plan's assets, the plan's assets do not influ-
ence when a benefit becomes nonforfeitable, nor do they
change the benefit status.49
The PBGC does not rely on tax revenues to ensure continu-
ous funding of pension plan benefits.5" Instead, PBGC funding
comes from insurance premiums from employers who adminis-
ter defined benefit pension plans, investment returns, and the
remaining funds collected from failed pension plans. 5
A. DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN INSURANCE PREMIUMS
The premiums the PBGC collects from the nearly 32,500 pen-
sion plans that it insures are one of the main sources of the
PBGC's funding.52 The PBGC collected $812 million in premi-
ums in 2002. 51 Single-employer defined benefit pension plans
pay $19 per participant per year. 54 Under-funded plans must
also pay a variable-rate risk-related premium of $9 for each
$1000 of benefits that have vested but are unfunded.55 When a
company's PBGC-insured pension fund becomes underfunded
and terminates, the PBGC becomes trustee of the plan and uses
47 Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et. seq.) by United States Su-




5o Scott L. Hazan et al., Airlines: Nosediving into Dangerous Pension Territory, 859
PLI/CoMM 499, (Practicing Law Institute: Commercial Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series), Jan. 2004, at *501.
51 Id.
52 Cook, supra note 43, at *1122. The PBGC is statutorily authorized to set the
premium rates and the way in which those rates are applied, as necessary, to fully
fund the PBGC. 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (2005).
53 Cook, supra note 43, at *1122.
54 Id.; Lowe, supra note 27, at *306 (citing ERISA § 4006(a) (3) (A) (i)).
55 Cook, supra note 43, at *1122; Lowe, supra note 27, at *306 (citing ERISA
§ 4006(a) (3)).
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both the previously collected insurance premiums and the re-
maining plan funds to pay benefits. 56 Plans typically terminate
because: (1) the employer can no longer financially support the
plan; (2) the plan has enough money to pay benefits but the
employer does not want to oversee it any longer; or (3) the
PBGC decides that the plan is underfunded and should be ter-
minated to protect the participants' interests and the PBGC in-
surance program.57 These three reasons give rise to three types
of terminations respectively called distress terminations, stan-
dard terminations, and involuntary terminations.58
B. DISTREss TERMINATION
A defined benefit plan administrator initiates a distress termi-
nation when the plan does not have sufficient funds to cover its
benefit liabilities. 59 To qualify for a distress termination, the em-
ployer and any other plan sponsors must each meet one of the
following three criteria: (1) "[he] has filed or has had filed
against [him], as of the proposed termination date, a petition
seeking liquidation in a case under Title 11 or under any similar
Federal law or law of a State or political subdivision of a State...
and such case has not, as of the proposed termination date,
been dismissed";60 (2) "[he] has filed or has had filed against
[him], as of the proposed termination date, a petition seeking
reorganization in a case under Title 11 or under any similar law
of a State or political subdivision of a State ... [and] such case
has not, as of the proposed termination date, been dismissed";6 1
or (3) if the individual demonstrates to PBGC's satisfaction that
"unless a distress termination occurs, [he] will be unable to pay
[his] debts when due and will be unable to continue in busi-
ness," or that "the costs of providing pension coverage have be-
come unreasonably burdensome to [him], solely as a result of
56 Cook, supra note 43, at *1122.
57 Hazan, supra note 50, at *501.
58 Lowe, supra note 27, at *301-05.
59 Id. at * 304.
60 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c) (2) (B) (i) (I) (2005).
61 Id. § 1341(c) (2) (B) (ii) (I)-(II). The individual seeking reorganization must
also submit to the PBGC any request made to the bankruptcy court for approval
of plan termination, and the bankruptcy court must determine that, "unless the
plan is terminated, such person will be unable to pay all its debts pursuant to a
plan of reorganization and will be unable to continue in business outside the
chapter 11 reorganization process." Id. § 1341(c) (2) (B) (ii) (III)-(IV). The bank-
ruptcy court must approve the plan termination. Id. § 1341 (c) (2) (B) (ii) (IV).
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the decline of [his] workforce covered as participants under all
single-employer plans of which [he] is a contributing sponsor. 62
When the PBGC receives notice of the plan administrator's
intent to terminate the pension plan, the PBGC first determines
whether the employer, and any other contributing sponsor,
meets the three distress termination criteria.63 The PBGC is ob-
ligated to notify the plan administrator of its findings as soon as
practicable. 4 If the distress termination requirements have
been met, the PBGC focuses its attention on the financial status
of the plan itself.6 The PBGC conducts a careful analysis to de-
termine that the plan either has sufficient assets to cover its
guaranteed benefits and benefit liabilities as of the termination
date, or that the PBGC is unable to make such determinations
based on the information available. 66 The PBGC must then no-
tify the plan administrator, as soon as practicable, regarding the
PBGC's findings.67
The PBGC's findings regarding the sufficiency of the plan for
guaranteed benefits and guaranteed liabilities dictate the
PBGC's next step.6 If the PBGC finds that the plan has suffi-
cient assets to cover its benefit liabilities, or if the PBGC cannot
determine this fact, the plan administrator distributes the plan
assets, makes certification to the PBGC that the assets were dis-
tributed, and then takes the necessary steps to carry out plan
termination.' 9
If, however, the PBGC is unable to determine, based on the
information provided to it, that the plan has sufficient assets to
cover its guaranteed benefits, the PBGC will pursue plan termi-
nation under 29 U.S.C. § 1342, ERISA's involuntary termination
provision."'
Between the time the plan administrator files a notice of plan
termination and the time when the PBGC makes its determina-
tion regarding the sufficiency of the plan's assets, the plan ad-
62 Id. § 1341 (c) (2) (B) (iii) (I)-(II).
63 Id. § 1341 (c) (2) (B).
64 Id. § 1341 (c) (2) (C).
65 See id. § 1341 (c) (3) (A).
66 Id. § 1341 (c) (3) (A) (i).
67 Id. § 1341 (c) (3) (A).
6, See id. § 1341(c) (3) (B) (i)-(iii).
69 Id. § 1341(c) (3) (B) (i)-(ii). "A single-employer plan is sufficient for benefit
liabilities if there is no amount of unfunded benefit liabilities under the plan." Id.
§ 1341(d)(1). "A single-employer plan is sufficient for guaranteed benefits if
there is no amount of unfunded guaranteed benefits under the plan." Id.
70 Id. § 1341 (c) (3) (B) (iii).
2005] 297
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ministrator must carry out his job in accordance with ERISA's
terms.7 ' During this interim period, the plan administrator: (1)
cannot distribute the plan's assets or pursue other actions re-
garding the plan termination;72 (2) can only make employer
contributions to the plan in the form of an annuity;73 (3) cannot
use the plan's assets "to purchase irrevocable commitments to
provide benefits from an insurer; ' 74 and (4) must continue to
pay all of the benefits that are fully vested and due pursuant to
the terms of the plan. Starting on the proposed termination
date, however, the plan administrator must curtail the level of
benefit payments to equal the level that the PBGC will guaran-
tee once the plan is terminated.7 5
A pension plan cannot terminate if doing so would violate the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement.7 6 The plan adminis-
trator must also give the PBGC, plan participants, and plan ben-
eficiaries notice of the termination at least sixty days prior to the
proposed termination date. 7 Once the plan is terminated, the
PBGC distributes the benefits to the plan participants. 78
C. STANDARD TERMINATION
A standard termination is a termination in which the plan as-
sets are sufficient to satisfy the plan's benefit liabilities. 79 The
plan administrator must send termination notices to plan par-
ticipants, beneficiaries, and unions at least 60 days, but not more
than 90 days, before the proposed plan termination date.8 0 If
the plan administrator gives all parties fifteen days' notice, he
can also freeze the plan and stop benefits from accruing fur-
ther.81 A plan administrator cannot, however, terminate a plan
71 Id. § 1341(c) (3) (D) (ii) (I)-(IV).
72 Id. § 1341(c) (3) (D) (ii) (I).
73 Id. § 1341(c) (3) (D) (ii) (II).
74 Id. § 1341 (c) (3) (D) (ii) (III).
75 Id. § 1341(c) (3) (D) (ii) (IV). If the plan administrator does not carry out his
duties as prescribed by ERISA, "any benefits which are not paid solely by reason
of compliance with subclause (IV) shall be due and payable immediately (to-
gether with interest, at a reasonable rate, in accordance with the regulations of
the [PBGC])." Id.
76 Lowe, supra note 27, at *304 (citing ERISA § 4041 (a) (3)).
77 Id.
78 See id.
79 Id. at *301 (citing ERISA § 4041 (b) (1) (D)).
80 Id. The plan administrator must also send a notice of intent to terminate
the pension plan to the PBGC. 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (b) (2) (A).
81 Lowe, supra note 27, at *301. However, "notice of a plan amendment that
significantly reduces the rate of future benefit accrual must be provided to af-
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if the employer and its union collectively bargained for the for-
mation of the plan, and termination of the plan would violate
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.8 2
Prior to the onset of a standard termination, the plan admin-
istrator must inform each plan participant and beneficiary as to
the level of that individual's benefits upon termination, as well
as the method by which the level was calculated." This notice is
generally "given within 180 days after [the] proposed termina-
tion date." 4 The administrator must also forward this notice to
the PBGC.85
The PBGC then has sixty days to issue notice of noncompli-
ance."6 If the administrator has not received a notice of non-
compliance within sixty days, asset distribution must begin as
soon as practicable if the plan's assets are still sufficient to cover
its liabilities.8 7 The asset distribution must be completed within
180 days, followed by a post-distribution certification that must
be sent to the PBGC within thirty days.88
In the event that the plan has more assets than liabilities, the
remaining balance can revert to the employer.89 The plan
terms, however, must provide for reversion,"' and such a provi-
sion must have been included in the plan for at least five years
before termination and reversion of the excess assets.9 Further,
if any part of the asset surplus is due to mandatory employee
fected participants within a reasonable time before the effective date of the plan
amendment. The notice must be written in a manner calculated to be under-
stood by the average plan participant." Id. Failure to provide the requisite notice
results in a $100-per day excise tax. Id.
82 Id. (citing ERISA § 4041 (a) (3)).
83 Id. Specifically, the plan administrator must give notice to each plan partici-
pant or beneficiary that specifies "the amount of benefit liabilities (if any) attribu-
table to such person as of the proposed termination date and the benefit form on
the basis of which such amount is determined..." 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (b) (2) (B) (i).
The plan administrator must express the length of service and age of the partici-
pant or beneficiary, the level of wages received, the interest rate, and any other
information needed to reach the level of benefit liabilities attributable to each
participant or beneficiary. Id. § 1341(b) (2) (B) (ii).
84 Lowe, supra note 27, at *301 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 4041.25).
85 Id. (citing ERISA § 4041 (b) (2) (A)).
86 Id. at *302 (citing ERISA § 4041 (b) (2) (C); 29 C.F.R. 4041.29).
87 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 4041 (b) (2) (D)).
I8 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 4041.28-4041.29).
89 Id. (citing ERISA § 4044(d) (1) (A)).
90 Id. at *303 (citing ERISA § 4044(d)(1)(c)).
91 Id. (citing ERISA § 4044(d)(1) "Amendment of the plan to permit reversion
may be precluded by other provisions of the plan and/or the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement."). Id.
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contributions, "employees must recover a portion of the surplus
equal to the percentage of the employees' benefits (other than
voluntary contributions) attributable to mandatory employee
contributions."9 2 The employer must share the excess assets
with those who are plan participants at the time the plan is ter-
minated, as well as with former plan participants who received
an annuity or a cash payout from the plan within three years
before the plan termination. 93
The reversion of surplus plan assets, however, is not tax free.
The reversion is taxed pursuant to the tax-benefit rule, and "a
50% non-deductible excise tax is imposed on the employer."94
The employer can reduce the 50% excise tax to 20% if it either
creates a qualified plan to replace the terminating plan, or
amends the plan to grant increased benefits.9 5 As another.op-
tion, "the employer may provide a pro rata benefit increase in
the accrued benefits of participants under the terminated plan
so that the aggregate present value of such increase is at least
equal to 20% of the maximum reversion possible."96.
D. INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION
The PBGC may involuntarily terminate an under funded pen-
sion plan.97 The PBGC may institute a termination on its own
accord if: (1) the plan does not meet the minimum funding
standards set forth in the Internal Revenue Code;9" (2) the plan
92 Id. (citing ERISA § 4044(d) (3) (A)).
93 Id. (citing ERISA § 4044(d) (3) (C)).
94 Id. at *302-03.
95 Id. at *303. "The qualified replacement plan may be either a new or existing
defined benefit or defined contribution plan. At least 95% of the active partici-
pants in the terminated plan who remain as employees after termination must be
active participants in the replacement plan." Id. If the employer chooses a de-
fined contribution plan to replace the terminated plan, the assets that are trans-
ferred to the new replacement plan "must either be allocated to participants'
accounts in the plan year in which the transfer occurs, or credited to a suspense
account and allocated ratably over a period not more than seven-plan-years be-
ginning with the year of transfer." Id. The employer must also designate to the
replacement plan at least 25% of the reverting assets. Id.
96 Lowe, supra note 27, at *303.
97 Id. at *305. "The [PBGC] shall as soon as practicable institute proceedings
under this section to terminate a single-employer plan whenever the [PBGC] de-
termines that the plan does not have assets available to pay benefits which are
currently due under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
98 Lowe, supra note 27, at *305.
A plan . . .shall have satisfied the minimum funding standard for
such plan for a plan year if as of the end of such plan year, the plan
does not have an accumulated funding deficiency. For purposes of
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will not have sufficient assets to pay its benefit liabilities when
they become due;9 9 (3) the plan's substantial owner receives a
benefit distribution from the plan in excess of $10,000;""' or (4)
maintenance of the plan would result in a long-run loss to the
PBGC that "may reasonably be expected to increase unreasona-
bly if the plan is not terminated."' 0 '
The PBGC has a great deal of latitude in the involuntary ter-
mination process. 10 2 The PBGC may prescribe a streamlined
termination process as long as the process has safeguards for
plan participants, beneficiaries, and the employer.""1 3 The PBGC
may also pool the assets of other terminated pension plans "for
purposes of administration, investment, payment of liabilities of
all such terminated plans, and such other purposes as it deter-
mines to be appropriate . "..."104
After making the determination that a pension plan is eligible
to be involuntarily terminated, the PBGC is "required" to insti-
tute proceedings before termination. 10°5 It may also, after giving
notice to the members of the pension plan, apply to a United
States district court to have a trustee appointed to administer
the plan under a decree issued to terminate the plan." 6
this section . . . the term "accumulated funding deficiency" means
for any plan the excess of the total charges to the funding standard
account for all plan years (beginning with the first plan year to
which this section applies) over the total credits to such account for
such years or, if less, the excess of the total charges to the alterna-
tive minimum funding standard account for such plan years over
the total credits to such accounts for such years.
26 U.S.C.A. § 412(a) (2).
99 Lowe, supra note 27, at *305.
100 Id.
101 Id. (quoting ERISA § 4042(a)).
102 See 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
103 Id.
104 Id.
1.5 Id. § 1342(b)(1).
106 Id.
If within 3 business days after the filing of an application under this
subsection, or such other period as the court may order, the admin-
istrator of the plan consents to the appointment of a trustee, or
fails to show why a trustee should not be appointed, the court may
grant the application and appoint a trustee to administer the plan
in accordance with its terms until the [PBGC] determines that the
plan should be terminated or that termination is unnecessary.
!d. § 1342(b) (2).
The PBGC is not limited to asking a court for the appointment of a trustee in
cases of involuntary termination. The PBGC can petition a court for the appoint-
ment of a trustee in any case. Id. ERISA gives an affirmative grant ofjurisdiction
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The PBGC institutes involuntary termination proceedings by
giving notice to the plan administrator, and then applying to a
"United States district court for a decree adjudicating that the
plan must be terminated.' °7 Once an application for the ap-
pointment of a new trustee, or the application seeking a judicial
decree terminating the plan has been submitted, the United
States district court to which the application was made has ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the plan and its property.108 The court
has jurisdiction to the extent that a federal district court has ju-
risdiction over cases brought under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.1°9 Further, pending the adjudication of a plan
termination, the court will move to stay "any pending mortgage
foreclosure, equity receivership, or other proceeding to reor-
ganize, conserve, or liquidate the plan or its property and any
other suit against any receiver, conservator, or trustee of the
plan or its property."'1 0
The court itself does not terminate the pension plan."1 ' In-
stead, if the court grants the decree-submitted either by the
PBGC or the trustee of the plan-the court grants the request-
ing party the authority to terminate the plan in accordance with
ERISA's provisions.l 2
to the United States district courts to appoint a trustee over an under-funded
pension plan. See Id. § 1342(b) (2) (A) ("[U]pon the petition of a plan adminis-
trator or the [PBGC], the appropriate United States district court may appoint a
trustee in accordance with the provisions of this section if the interests of the
plan participants would be better served by the appointment of the trustee
..... ). Id.
107 Id. § 1342(c).
108 Id. § 1342(f).
109 Id.
110 Id.
"I Id. § 1342(c).
112 Id.
If the court to which an application is made . . . issues the decree
requested in [the] application, in addition to the powers described
in subparagraph (A), the trustee shall have the power - (i) to pay
benefits under the plan in accordance with the requirements of
this subchapter; (ii) to collect for the plan any amounts due the
plan, including but not limited to the power to collect from the
persons obligated to meet the requirements of section 1082 of this
title or the terms of the plan; (iii) to receive any payment made by
the corporation to the plan under this subchapter; (iv) to com-
mence, prosecute, or defend on behalf of the plan any suit or pro-
ceeding involving the plan; (v) to issue, publish, or file such
notices, statements, and reports as may be required by the [PBGC]
or any order of the court; (vi) to liquidate the plan assets; (vii) to
recover payments under section 1345(a) of this title; and (viii) to
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E. THE STATUS OF THE PBGC AND AIRLINE DEFINED BENEFIT
PENSION PLANS
The PBGC has plunged into debt as more and more corpora-
tions terminate their defined benefit pension plans. 3 In fiscal
year 2001, the PBGC had a $7.7 billion surplus. 14 That surplus
evaporated, and the PBGC recorded a $3.6 billion deficit in fis-
cal-year 2002, and an $11.2 billion deficit in fiscal-year 2003."'
In 2004, the PBGC had a record-breaking $23.3 billion deficit." 6
"[D]efined benefit plans have been hit by the 'perfect storm' of
declining interest rates, weak equity markets, and a business
slowdown."' 17
The airline industry is a major contributor to the PBGC's defi-
Cit. 1 With the termination of United Airlines pilots' defined
benefit plan, terminated airline pensions make up five of the
PBGC's ten largest claims." 9  United's termination dumped
$1.4 billion in liabilities on the PBGC, 20 while Pan American
Airlines, US Airways pilots, and Eastern Airlines, account for
$841 million, $726 million, and $552 million in liabilities, re-
spectively.' 2 ' To add insult to injury, United's termination of
the remainder of its pension plans adds $5 billion more to the
do such other acts as may be necessary to comply with this sub-
chapter or any order of the court and to protect the interests of
plan participants and beneficiaries.
Id. § 1342(d) (1) (B) (i)-(viii).
I I See Cook, supra note 43, at *1123.
114 Id.
115 Id. The PBGC has also seen the level of benefit payments over which it is
responsible skyrocket from $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2002 to almost $2.5 billion in
fiscal year 2003. Id.
116 Id.; Schroeder, supra note 7.
117 Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, supra
note 28.
I's Dan Reed, United Pension Debate Goes on in Wake of PBGC Move to End Pilots'
Plan, USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 2005.
119 Id.
121 United's plan termination was an involtntary termination, initiated by the
PBGC. See id. The airline, in an agreement with its pilots' union, had agreed to
wait until May 2005 before terminating the plan in a distress termination, thereby
allowing approximately $140 million more in PBGC guaranteed benefits to ac-
crue. Id. In return, the pilots union had agreed not to oppose the May termina-
tion, and to take a 15% salary cut. Turbulence - American corporate pensions,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2005, available at 2005 WL 64614758. Seeing the chance to
save money, and the fact that termination was inevitable, the PBGC stepped in,
and with the approval of an Illinois federal judge, terminated the pension plan
early. Reed, supra note 118.
121 Reed, supra note 118.
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PBGC's pension payments, and represents "the biggest corpo-
rate pension default in history. 1 22
"[T]he airline industry currently is in the midst of a funda-
mental business crisis, because of the events of September 11,
SARS, and the Iraq war. ' 123 As a result, airlines looking for ways
to cut costs have zeroed in on pension plan terminations as a
way to save billions and attain a' compeitive edge. For example,
UAL, the parent company of United Airlines, stated that it had
to 'jettison the plans to become more attractive to lenders
needed to fund its emergence from Chapter 11."124 Bradley
Belt, the executive director of the PBGC, fears that moves like
that of UAL could force other major. airlines to, follow suit in
order to match UAL's post-termination improved cash posi-
tion.125 Mr. Belt recently told Congress that such a competitive
domino effect would force the PBGC to assume approximately
$31 billion in unfunded pension liabilities.12 6
Further, Mr. Belt does not believe that the current $19-per
participant insurance premiums are sufficient to cover the inevi-
table onslaught of pension benefit liabilities. 27 In fact, he be-
lieves that at the current rate of pension plan terminations, the
PBGC is on the verge of a taxpayer bailout.1 28 Oddly enough,
labor unions want a government bailout.1 29 Alan Reuther, the
legislative director of the United Auto Workers, believes that
"[a] t the end of the day, the proper course is to have an infusion
of general revenues to cover the airline and steel liabilities that
122 Jaret Seiberg, Setting free the bulls, THEDEAL.coM, Jan. 10, 2005, available at
2005 WLNR 4377446.
123 Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, supra
note 28.
124 Carey, Agency Seeks UAL Pension Takeover, supra note 2..
125 See Pilling, supra note 2; see alsoJeff Yastine & Susie Gharib, Nightly Business
Report, Dec. 30, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 17595634 ("Certainly one of the
concerns we have is that they will look to try to [dunip their pension plans]. Any
number of airline companies CEO's that are not now bankrupt have indicated
that they consider that to be a viable option, enter bankruptcy and try to shed
their pension liabilities, shift those costs onto the [flederal government, onto
other premium payers.").
126 Pilling, supra note 2.
127 Marketplace: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation needs to look out for its own
interests (Minnesota Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 30, 2004) (transcription on file
with the author).
128 Pilling, supra note 2; see also Robert Dodge, Safety net no longer is so safe -
Pension chief says insurance program's troubles are many, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan.
16, 2005, at Dl.
129 Schroeder, supra note 7.
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the PBGC is going to be taking over."''" In contrast, the Bush
administration and several congressmen are considering reme-
dies that would keep the PBGC solvent by placing the burden
on the companies that pose the highest risk of terminating their
plans, rather than on the government.' Notwithstanding the
differing views on how to solve the looming PBGC crisis, every-
one agrees that something must be done. "At stake is the viabil-
ity of one of the principal means of providing stable retirement
income to millions of American workers."' 32
IV. SOLUTIONS
A. ENSURING THE PBGC's SOLVENCY
As stated previously, the PBGC does not rely on tax revenues
to ensure continuous -funding of pension plan benefits.' 3 In-
stead, the PBGC collects insurance premiums from employers
who administer defined benefit pension plans, earns money on
investments, and pools assets from the many terminated plans
under its control.' 34 ERISA sets the current regular premium at
$19 for each worker participating in a defined benefit pension
plan. 13 5 The pension plan must also pay "an amount equal to
$9.00 for each $1,000 (or fraction thereof) of unfunded vested
benefits under the plan as of the close of the preceding plan
year." 136
ERISA's terms grant the PBGC significant latitude in setting
the level of insurance premiums. Section 1306's sweeping lan-
guage allows the PBGC to "prescribe such schedules of premium
rates and bases for the application of those rates as may be nec-
essary to provide sufficient revenue to the fund for the [PBGC]
to carry out its functions.""' 7 Although the PBGC's insurance
premiums could presumably be set at any level, ERISA requires




133 Hazan, supra note 50, at *501.
134 Id.
115 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (3) (A) (i). The $19 premium applies to single-employer
pension plans, which are at issue in this comment. Id.
136 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(E)(ii). Vested benefits are those that are nonfor-
feitable, as defined by ERISA. Campbell, supra note 47, § 14 (citing Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359 (1980)).
137 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1).
13s Id.
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The first step necessary to ensure the PBGC's solvency is to
increase the insurance premiums.'39 At the current level of $19,
Mr. Belt, the executive director of the PBGC, does not believe
that the PBGC will have the assets to cover its current liabilities
going into the future, and especially not the potential future lia-
bilities if other major air carries follow UAL's cost-cutting strat-
egy of terminating pension plans. 4 °
The Bush administration recently proposed a graduated pre-
mium plan that would charge businesses at risk of bankruptcy a
higher insurance premium."' This plan, however, will require a
major overhaul of ERISA because, currently, PBGC premiums
must be assessed uniformly across all single-employer plans.1 42
ERISA's terms would have to be changed, and Congress would
be forced to create some sort of financial blue-print to aid the
PBGC in determining what it means to be "at risk of bank-
ruptcy." In addition to these statutory changes, Congress would
be forced to create a method for the PBGC to conduct valua-
tions of each individual company to determine its financial situ-
ation. Funding for such a valuation process would undoubtedly
fall on the already beleaguered PBGC.
Rather than create a graduated insurance premium, Congress
should increase the $9 risk premium 4 ' that is imposed on each
$1,000 of unfunded vested benefits.'44 The risk for the PBGC is
not simply that companies may declare bankruptcy, or even ter-
minate their pension plans. If a bankrupt company's pension
139 Schroeder, supra note 7 ("To shore up agency revenue, the Bush adminis-
tration is likely to propose increased premiums for all participating companies
.. •
140 Marketplace: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Needs to Look Out for its Own
Interests, supra note 129.
141 Schroeder, supra note 7.
142 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1).
143 Id. § 1306(a) (3) (E) (ii).
144 There is fear that increasing both the general pension insurance premium,
as well as the risk premium assessed on unfunded vested liabilities, will lead air-
lines to terminate their grossly under-funded defined benefit pension plans.
Schroeder, supra note 7 ("Employer groups and unions say that imposing higher
premiums or stiffer rules could prompt some companies to freeze or eliminate
their pension plans."). Major air carriers currently experiencing hard financial
times would be hit by both of these increases. Airlines such as Delta, whose pen-
sion plans are under-funded by nearly $5 billion, would obviously absorb the gen-
eral premium increase, but would also face a heavy risk premium. Kirsten
Tagami & Russell Grantham, Delta Cuts Some Fees - Frequent Fliers' Gripes Also Ad-
dressed, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Dec. 16, 2004, at El. Accordingly, Con-
gress must create a disincentive for employers that will dissuade them from
terminating their pensions and turning them over to the PBGC.
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plan is fully funded, then the PBGC does not realize a deficit.
The real risk to the PBGC is that companies will terminate their
pension plans with millions of dollars in unfunded benefits, a
large portion of which the PBGC must guarantee. Increasing
the $9 risk premium increases the burden on those companies
that truly pose the risk to the PBGC should they terminate their
pension plan. Further, no major overhaul of the ERISA pre-
mium provisions, and no eccentric valuation scheme that would
burden the PBGC, would be necessary.
Focus should next shift to ERISA's funding rules. Current ER-
ISA funding rules require catch-up payments, also known as def-
icit-reduction contributions, when the value of the benefits in a
defined benefit pension plan drop below 90% of the required
funding. 4 5 These funding rules often go into effect during a
recession, when the value of a plan's funds diminishes due to
"declining interest rates, falling asset prices and low earnings
.... ,,4' As a result, employers face what has been called a
counter-cyclical burden; they must make large pension plan
contributions during recessions, and smaller contributions
when the economy is prospering. 14' For example, Delta cur-
rently must come up with hundreds of millions of dollars to
catch up its pension plans to the required funding level. 48 Con-
sidering the company's current financial status, it believes its
only recourse is to convince Congress to stretch out its pay-
ments, or face bankruptcy. 149
The first change to ERISA's funding rules should be to re-
move the current full-funding limits to allow employers to over-
fund their pension plans during prosperous times. 15' This will
create a funding cushion to absorb a portion of the decrease in
145 Seiberg, supra note 122.
146 Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, supra
note 28, at 18.
147 Id. The counter-cyclical problem that is fostered by the current funding
rules is also evidenced by the dramatic increase in pension plan contributions
during the recent recession. Id. at 12. From 1999 to 2001, the contributions of
the Fortune 1,000 companies to defined benefit pension plans totaled $41 bil-
lion. Id. In 2002, alone, these same companies were required to contribute $43.5
billion. Id. Analysts predict that if the current rules remain unchanged, the For-
tune 1000 companies will have to contribute nearly $160 billion total to their
defined benefit pension plans over fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Id.
148 Tagami, supra note 144.
149 Id.
150 Schroeder, supra note 7 ("[The Bush administration] may also propose
making it easier for companies to contribute more to their plans during flush
times.").
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the value of the plan funds when the economy takes a down-
turn. As a result, employers will no longer be forced to make
such large deficit-reduction contributions during a recession.'
And to encourage over-funding, Congress should grant employ-
ers tax deductions for contributions that exceed mandatory
funding levels.'52 Allowing employers to over-fund their pen-
sion plans will decrease the severity of their "catch-up" payments
when the fund value decreases, thereby decreasing the likeli-
hood that an employer will terminate its pension plan and force
the PBGC to shoulder more debt.
Congress should then shift its focus to the PBGC's lien rights.
When an employer terminates a defined benefit pension plan
with unfunded liabilities, the PBGC has two causes of action
against the plan sponsor. 153 The first claim "amounts to the
lesser of: (1) the difference between the value of the plan assets
at the time of termination and the amount of the plan's obliga-
tions to its participants; or (2) 30% of the net worth of the plan
sponsor (the "Unfunded Liability Claim"). 154 When a defined
benefit plan terminates, the PBGC's second cause of action is
for the recovery of ERISA's minimum funding contributions
that the plan sponsor or employer did not pay. 155 This is called
the Minimum Funding Contribution Claim.156
These causes of action-the Unfunded Liability Claim and
the Minimum Funding Contribution Claim-accrue against
both the plan sponsor and his control group. 57 As a result,
"[t]he PBGC can assert liens against the plan sponsor's assets
151 Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, supra
note 28, at 15 ("Mr. LoBombarde commented on the situation where plans go
from being prevented from making contributions to extremely high deficit re-
duction contributions (DRC) in the space of just a few years.").
152 Id. at 21 ("Mr. Kelly believed that employers should receive tax deductions
for contributions in excess of what is currently allowed."). Some have suggested
that, in conjunction with income tax deductions for over-funding a pension plan,
Congress should rescind the excise tax and allow some of the surplus to revert
back to the employer tax-free. Id. at 17. This is not advisable in the current
situation. Congress should not make it painless, or tax-free, for an employer to
take money out of a pension plan. All incentives should be geared toward en-
couraging employers to fund their pension plans, not toward taking money out
of the plan.
153 Hazan, supra note 50, at *502.
154 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)).
155 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1362(c)).
156 Id.
157 Id. The plan sponsor and the plan control group are jointly and severally
liable for the Unfunded Liability Claim and the Minimum Funding Contribution
Claim. Id.
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(or those in the sponsor's control group) to secure" these claims
upon plan termination. 58  If, however, the plan sponsor termi-
nates the pension plan after declaring bankruptcy, the Bank-
ruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions preclude the PBGC's
liens from attaching.159
The PBGC must be more vigilant in instituting involuntary
plan terminations in order to perfect its liens before employers
have a chance to file for bankruptcy. 1" The ERISA drafters' au-
thorization of involuntary termination, when maintenance of
the plan would unreasonably increase the PBGC's long-run
losses, grants the PBGC significant latitude.' 6 ' The PBGC
should capitalize on this criterion's subjectivity, much like it did
when it saved $140 million by stepping in early and involuntarily
terminating one of United's pension plans.
16 2
Congress should also strongly consider granting the PBGC
priority status on its liens for the under-funded portion of a ter-
minated pension plan.' 63 Airlines increasingly put their un-
funded pension liabilities on the PBGC, not just to survive, but
to gain an advantageous cash position and a competitive edge.
This maneuver stands to gain popularity, as airlines such as UAL
terminate their grossly underfunded pension plans "to become
158 Id.
159 Id. (citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 115 B.R. 760, 780 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990)). The PBGC could only enjoy secured creditor status if it were to perfect
its lien prior to the employer declaring bankruptcy. Jill L. Uyalki, Promises ]Wade,
Promises Broken: Securing Defined Benefit Pension Plan Income in the Wake of Employer
Bankruptcy: Should We Rethink Priority Status for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Coprora-
tion?, 6 ELDER LJ. 77, 96 (1998). This would only occur if the PBGC demanded
payment and filed notice of its claim before the employer had a chance to de-
clare bankruptcy. Id.
1- See Frank Cummings, Terminating Defined Benefit Pension Plans: An Introduc-
tory Overview of The Rules and Liabilities, SF83 ALI-ABA 533 (A.B.A. Continuing
Legal Educ.), May 3, 2001, at *560. The lien is perfected on the plan's termina-
tion date. Id.
Ii See Lowe, supra note 27, at *305.
162 Reed, supra note 118. The termination of United's pension plan occurred
after United's bankruptcy filing. In any event, it is this type of proactive posture
that this comment advocates for the PBGC.
163 Uyalki, supra note 159, at 96. Ms. Uyalki proposes that Congress grant pri-
ority status to PBGC liens primarily as an added level of insurance for employee
pensions. Id. at 111 ("In short, priority status confers a wealth of benefits to both
pension plan participants and society. Pensioners would no longer fear the fate
of their future, and society would no longer have to bear the economic brunt of
those whose pensions have failed them."). This comment views granting lien pri-
ority status not so much as added security, but rather as a great disincentive to
companies that attempt to unload their pension liabilities on the PBGC in order
to secure funding to emerge from bankruptcy.
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more attractive to lenders."164 Mr. Belt, the executive director
of the PBGC, fears that more airlines will follow UAL's lead.'6 5
In fact, "[a] ny number of airline companies CEO's that are not
now bankrupt have indicated that they consider that to be a via-
ble option, enter bankruptcy and try to shed their pension liabil-
ities, [and] shift those costs onto the Federal government, onto
other premium payers. 166 Facilitating the ripening of PBGC's
claims into liens, and granting PBGC liens priority status, would
greatly diminish the current incentive for airlines to declare
bankruptcy in an attempt to shed their unfunded pension liabil-
ities. Airlines like UAL could not simply 'jettison" their pension
plans to look "more attractive" for lenders; they would have a
lien attached to their assets that could amount to as much as
30% of the airline's net worth. 167
Another way to dissuade airlines and other employers from
shedding their unfunded benefit liabilities onto the PBGC is to
amend the Bankruptcy Code to preclude the discharge of un-
funded pension liabilities. Congress would be wise to craft legis-
lation that parallels the Bankruptcy Code's language on student
discharges of government-backed education loans. Under the
current code, a student-debtor cannot discharge government-
backed education loans in bankruptcy "unless excepting such
debt from discharge ... will impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents. ' 168 Congress should re-
quire a company to demonstrate that not excepting the un-
funded pension liabilities would prevent the company from
emerging from bankruptcy, or will result in other undue hard-
ship. There is no good policy reason to make it easier for a
major airline to dump its liabilities onto the federal government
than for a heavily-indebted college graduate to do the same.
Adopting these suggestions would put many airlines in a
tough situation because they increase the cost of maintaining an
under-funded defined benefit plan. They also make it much
more difficult to push benefit liabilities onto the federal govern-
ment through bankruptcy. The suggestions, however, are
needed to ensure the PBGC's solvency. Congress must look at
the situation in the aggregate, and not make legislative and pro-
164 Carey, Agency Seeks UAL Pension Takeover, supra note 2.
165 Yastine, supra note 125.
166 Id.
167 Hazan, supra note 50, at *502.
168 In re Boykin, 313 B.R. 516, 519 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004) (quoting 11
U.S.C.A. § 523(a) (8) (West 1993 & Supp. 2004)).
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cedural changes with the sole intention of propping up the
airlines.
Major air carriers can survive the implementation of these
suggestions and improve their competitive position without rely-
ing on plan terminations and bankruptcy. The airlines should
begin making a major push away from defined benefit plans and
toward defined contribution plans. Such a shift would take the
burden of insurance premiums and "catch-up" payments off of
the airlines.169 More importantly, it would remove the risk that
the PBGC will be stuck with billions in unfunded pension
liabilities.
Admittedly, a move toward defined contribution plans would
require changes in collective bargaining agreements, 7 ' and for
the airlines' labor unions to change their current policy of
staunchly advocating only defined benefit plans. Unionized em-
ployees must begin to realize that a switch to a defined contribu-
tion plan-a switch airlines should advocate-does not
necessarily increase their risk, but instead changes the risk. Cur-
rently, under a defined benefit plan in the airline industry, em-
ployees face the risk that their employer will terminate the plan,
and that the PBGC will only guarantee a level of benefits far
below what the employees expected when they joined the
16 The airlines would not be liable for any unfunded benefits, because the
level of benefits in a defined contribution plan is not predetermined, but rather
is based on employee contributions, employer contributions, and the state of the
stock market. Pensions and Retirement Funds, supra note 35, § 16 (citing 26
U.S.C.A. § 414(i)).
170 The Railway Labor Act ("RLA") has governed relations between the airlines
and their labor unions since 1936. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246,
248 (1994). The RLA separates disputes between the two parties into major and
minor disputes, and designates different dispute resolution procedures for each.
Id. at 252-53. Major disputes arise when one party seeks to change or create con-
tractual rights in a collective bargaining agreement. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 302 (1989). A minor dispute, in contrast,
is a dispute over the interpretation of the existing collective bargaining agree-
ment. Id. at 303. In the event of a major dispute, the parties are required to
undergo a lengthy bargaining process and are statutorily obligated to maintain
the status quo until the process is complete. Id. at 302-03. A federal district court
can, in fact, issue an injunction to enforce the status quo. Id. at 303. In the event
of a minor dispute, the parties are not obligated to maintain the status quo, but
they are subject to binding arbitration. Id. Assuming that a defined benefit plan
was included in a collective bargaining agreement, an airline attempt to unilater-
ally change it to a defined contribution plan would constitute a major dispute. As
a result, the parties would be subject to mediation and required to maintain the
status quo.
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plan. 171 For example, "a 56-year-old pilot who retires with 26
years seniority would get about $2,200 a month in PBGC insur-
ance payments, rather than the $8,200 expected .... 72 Under
a defined contribution plan, employees shift their risk to the
stock market. The employees would also remove the defined
contribution "golden-handcuffs,"'1 73 which tie them to their em-
ployer, and would give themselves more freedom to seek alter-
native employment.
The efficacy of defined contribution plans in the airline in-
dustry seems to be improving slowly. Recently, Delta "pilots rati-
fied changes ... that froze their pension plan and started a new
defined contribution plan, similar to a 401 (k) option that most
employers use."'1 74 The shift to defined contribution plans is a
sound financial move for the airline industry and would allow
major carriers to better fulfill the pension promises made to
their employees. Furthermore, considering the industry's finan-
cial situation, it stands to decrease the burden on the PBGC go-
ing into the future.
Congress must act soon to ensure the solvency of the PBGC.
Congress's first step should be to increase the $19 pension insur-
ance premiums. The second step should be to increase the risk
premium, currently $9 for every $1,000 of unfunded, vested
benefits. Companies with high amounts of unfunded benefits
are the true threat to the PBGC. Next, Congress should remove
the upper funding limits currently in place to allow employers
to over-fund their pension plans in prosperous times, greatly di-
minishing the required "catch-up" payments that often come
during a recession. The PBGC itself must take a proactive
stance, use the latitude Congress granted it, and involuntarily
terminate those plans that will unreasonably increase the
171 An airline cannot terminate a pension plan if doing so would violate its
collective bargaining agreement. Lowe, supra note 27, at *304. If the airline de-
clares bankruptcy, however, it could move under Bankruptcy Code § 1113 code
for the rejection of the entire collective bargaining agreement. Mark Vogel, Em-
plcyee Benefits in Bankruptcy Proceedings, N98EBMB ABA-LGLED D-1 (A.B.A. Con-
tinuing Legal Educ.), Apr. 16-17, 1998, at D-10. Employees would be better
served by changing to a defined contribution plan than by driving the airline into
bankruptcy where they could do away with their entire collective bargaining
agreement, which dictates all of the terms of their employment.
172 Reed, supra note 118.
173 Forman, supra note 31, at 196.
174 Eric Torbenson, Struggling With the Load: Cash-strapped airlines are dragging
down the pension system. And Social Security? An overhaul may get off the ground.
Dumping retirement obligations can keep carriers flying - at a big cost for workers, DALtAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 16, 2005, at D1.
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PBGC's long-run losses. Congress should also grant the PBGC's
liens priority status and restrict the discharge of unfunded pen-
sion liabilities. These changes will force companies to resort to
bankruptcy only out of necessity, not for beneficial strategic rea-
sons. In light of these changes, which are geared toward the
long-term health of the pension system and the PBGC, airlines
should begin a stronger push toward defined contribution
plans. Airlines must educate their employees about the benefits
of a defined contribution plan, and the pitfalls of defined bene-
fit plans, especially in the tumultuous airline industry. Doing so
will take a substantial financial burden off of the airlines' shoul-
ders and alleviate much of the risk to the PBGC.
B. PROTECTION FOR BENEFICIARIES OF DEFINED
BENEFIT PENSIONS
The onslaught of pension plan terminations has devastated
thousands of employees who planned their retirement around
their "defined" pensions. "As a practical example of the impact,
[United] and [its] pilots union said . . . that a 56-year-old pilot
who retires with 26 years seniority would get about $2,200 a
month in PBGC pension insurance payments, rather than the
$8,200 expected under the existing plan."'' 75 Clearly, more
needs to be done to protect employees from the reality that
comes with their employers' broken pension promises.
Currently, when the PBGC becomes the statutory trustee of a
terminated pension plan, it sends each plan beneficiary an ini-
tial determination letter detailing the level of benefits due him
or her.171 If the participant 177 disagrees with the PBGC's benefit
level determination, he or she can appeal to the PBGC Appeals
Board.'78 "The decision of the Appeals Board constitutes the
final agency action by the PBGC with respect to the determina-
175 Reed, supra note 118.
176 Coleman v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 94 F. Stipp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C.
2000) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 4003.1(a), (b)(6)-(7), 4003.21 (2004)).
177 Appeals may be brought only by an individual defined as an aggrieved per-
son. "Aggrieved person means any participant, beneficiary, plan administrator,
contributing sponsor of a single-employer plan or member of such a contributing
sponsor's controlled group ... or employer that is adversely affected by an initial
determination of the PBGC." 29 C.F.R. § 4003.2.
178 Coleman, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 4003.7); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 4003.1(7) (including "[d]eterminations made under section 4022 (b) or (c),
section 4022A (b) through (e), or section 4022B of ERISA of the amount of
benefits payable to participants and beneficiaries under covered plans" as
grounds on which plan beneficiaries may file an administrative appeal).
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tion."' 79 Only after final PBGC action can the participant seek
judicial review.18 0
Although ERISA itself does not specifically require the exhaus-
tion of remedies available under pension plans, as a matter of
judicial discretion, barring exceptional circumstances, plaintiffs
seeking a determination pursuant to ERISA of rights under their
pension plans must.., exhaust available administrative remedies
* . .before they may bring suit in federal court.'81
Once an employee has exhausted his administrative remedies,
and is eligible for judicial review of the PBGC's benefit determi-
nation, it becomes even more unlikely that the employee will
prevail. "Upon review, an agency's interpretation and applica-
tion of its own regulation[s] is entitled to substantial defer-
ence." 182 The administrative agency's decision will only be
overturned if it is deemed to have been arbitrary and capri-
cious.'8 " "The scope of review under the 'arbitrary and capri-
cious' standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency. "184
Pension plan participants are not given enough judicial pro-
tection when they have a grievance with the PBGC over their
benefits level. Currently, courts require aggrieved beneficiaries
to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing a com-
plaint. This stance puts those who complain of improper pen-
sion benefits in a nearly helpless position because a court will
only overturn the PBGC's decision if it is arbitrary or capri-
cious.' 85 This is especially alarming considering the complexity
of determining which benefits should be insured. 186
179 29 C.F.R. § 4003.59(b).
is0 Coleman, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 4003.59); 29 C.F.R.
§ 4003.7.
181 Boivin v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 110, 116 n.8 (D.D.C. 2003)
(quoting Communications Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 F.3d 426,
431-32 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); Coop. Benefit Adm'rs, Inc. v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 336
(5th Cir. 2004).
182 Fetty v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 915 F. Supp. 230, 234 (D. Colo. 1996)
(citing Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1537 (10th Cir. 1991)).
183 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653 (1990)
(applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in looking at the deci-
sions of the PBGC).
184 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
IS5 LTV Corp., 496 U.S. at 653.




ERISA's explicit language "does not.., require" the exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies. '87 Further, it is clear from view-
ing other administrative dispute resolution legislation that
Congress knows how to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies when it wants to.'1 8 Accordingly, courts should as-
sume that Congress considered requiring exhaustion, but de-
cided against it. '"
By requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies,
courts are forcing individuals with already greatly diminished in-
comes-such as the United pilot who saw a 73% reduction in his
pension benefits-to retain counsel and demonstrate that no
reasonable person could have reached the decision that the
PBGC did when determining his benefit level. 90 As airline pen-
sion plan terminations increase, so does the number of individu-
als who have virtually no chance of prevailing in a benefit-level
dispute.
Further, only standard terminations require the plan adminis-
trator to, upon sending the PBGC a notice of the intent to ter-
minate a plan, also send plan participants and beneficiaries
notice of how their benefits were tabulated.' As a result, air-
line employees who have seen their pension plans go through
distress and involuntary terminations are left to wait for the plan
to terminate, for the PBGC to be appointed trustee of the plan,
and then for the PBGC to issue an initial determination letter
before they know what level of benefits to expect. Further, they
do not have the luxury of having the plan administrator's bene-
fit determination to compare against the PBGC's. Congress
should amend ERISA to provide for a benefit determination let-
ter in all instances of plan termination. This change will better
187 Boivin, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 116 n.8.
188 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000) (stating that an individual who disagrees
with the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security "may obtain a review of
such decision by a civil action after a final decision") (emphasis added); 26 U.S.C.
§ 7422(a) (2000) ("No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
Secretary.") (emphasis added).
119 Cf In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2004) ("When Congress
provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have authority to
create others. The proper inference, and the one we adopt here, is that Congress
considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones
set forth.") (quoting United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000)).
1911 See In re Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. Coop. Retirement Income Plan, 777 F.
Stipp. 1179, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
191 Lowe, supra note 27, at *301 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (b) (2) (B)).
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equip airline employees to decide if they need to dispute the
PBGC's decision.
Pension plan participants do not receive enough protection
in the dispute resolution process with the PBGC. Airline em-
ployees are increasingly seeing their pension plans terminated
either involuntarily or through a distress termination. As a re-
sult, they do not receive a notice from their plan administrator
regarding the level of accrued benefits. Also, it is very difficult
to win a disagreement with the PBGC. Courts, as a matter of
discretion, not statutory mandate, currently require pension
plan beneficiaries to exhaust their administrative remedies
before filing suit over their benefit levels. This decision gives
beneficiaries the nearly insurmountable task of proving that the
PBGC's decision was arbitrary and capricious. Congress must
amend ERISA to require plan administrators give the same no-
tice to their plan beneficiaries, no matter what type of termina-
tion is instituted, and courts should refrain from requiring
exhauston through judicial fiat. If necessary, Congress could re-
work ERISA to explicitly not require exhaustion. These changes
will grant employees, especially those of the major airlines,
needed protection as pension plan terminations become more
and more commonplace.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the last few years, airlines have seen the value of their
defined benefit plan assets shrink, and the size of their catch-up
payments swell. As a result, the airlines have begun to jettison
their pension plans liabilities, leaving the PBGC carrying the
debt load, which recently reached $23.3 billion. Congress must
act before a savings-and-loan-type taxpayer bailout of the PBGC
becomes necessary. Pension insurance premiums should be in-
creased, funding rules should be reworked, and the discharge of
pension liabilities in bankruptcy should be made much more
difficult. The airlines themselves can also act to relieve their
burden, and that of the PBGC. Airlines must begin a stronger
push toward defined contribution plans to rid themselves of the
premium costs and pension liabilities that accompany defined
benefit plans. Moving toward defined benefit plans is also a way
of removing the PBGC's risk going into the future. Airline labor
unions need to realize that they are better off acquiescing to the
change than driving the airline into bankruptcy, where the en-
tire collective bargaining agreement can be rejected. These
congressional actions, coupled with a push from the airlines
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away from defined benefit plans, will ensure the PBGC's sol-
vency. Taxpayers should not be forced to pay for pension bene-
fits that they did not promise and do not receive.
Congress must also act to provide beneficiaries of terminated
pension plans more judicial protection. Plan administrators
should be required to provide a benefit-calculation notice dur-
ing distress and involuntary plan terminations. It is during these
types of terminations that plan funds were most likely to have
been mishandled. Therefore, beneficiaries to these plans need
a clear understanding of why their benefits were cut, and
whether they should file a dispute. Further, courts should not
require plan beneficiaries to exhaust their administrative reme-
dies prior to filing suit. Congress knows exactly how to draft
exhaustion requirements in administrative legislation, and it did
not do so in ERISA. Courts should not add such an ERISA re-
quirement by judicial fiat.
Notwithstanding the differing views on how to solve the loom-
ing crisis at the PBGC, everyone agrees that something must be
done. "At stake is the viability of one of the principal means of
providing stable retirement income to millions of American
workers."192
192 Schroeder, supra note 7.
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